Despite facing a common threat, why are Arab leaders always divided and incompetent? What is the reason behind Arab disagreement? Can the official Arab system ever overcome its differences or is it always doomed to failure? Can Arab leaders be expected to fulfill their people’s expectations at such a critical historical juncture?

Due to structural deficiencies and compounded problems that plagued the official Arab system for decades, it is highly unlikely that it would ever be able to face up to challenges. The Arab world is reaping the results of years of ad-hoc policies, internal fragility, lack of a strategic doctrine, and the total absence of institutionalized decision-making. Decisions are always made in an ad-hoc fashion and are subject to the whims and idiosyncrasies of individual Arab leaders.

Even Arab differences are not the result of clear-cut conflict of national interest, but rather the diverging personal perceptions of ailing leaders. More specifically, the decision-making structure in most Arab states involves an authoritative decision-maker acting alone, with little or no consultation with other people or institutions except for a small group of subordinate advisors entirely dependent on him for the continuance of their present position. These advisors have no independent power base and no role that permits them to regularly obtain information on foreign affairs different from the decision-maker they serve.¹³

In a state-centric world, the principal goals of every state should be the preservation of territorial integrity and physical security. On the contrary, in the Arab context, “national security” usually refers to the physical survival of a regime. Given the absence of institutions to solve disputes and the lack of regime legitimacy, the Arab political order often becomes a zero-sum contest between regimes and elites often supported and manipulated by the West on one hand, and general society and popular sentiment on the other. As a result, the unitary concept of “national interest” itself loses much significance in the Arab political lexicon, due to the conflicting dichotomy between regime interests, the security of tenure of existing authorities, and societal interests, the collective interests of the community.¹⁴ 

The Arab predicament was historically compounded by the carving up of the Arab parts of the Ottoman Empire after World War I by Western powers and the forced establishment of a Jewish homeland in the heart of the Middle East. This led to the creation of arbitrary state entities with total disregard to the sensitivities of the region’s inhabitants. It created a dilemma between the individual securities of the Arab states and those of the Arab community or the Ummah as a whole. Hence, the tension between Arab elites upholding the state-centric logic and the majority of the citizens rejecting the Western imposed order and calling for the supremacy of the Ummah and its communal interests.

Nothing could be more indicative of the failure of the Arab system to deal with crises, than the official Arab reaction to the events of September 11^th and its aftermath. Rather than using this event to highlight Muslim suffering and the need to readdress Muslim sensitivities across the globe, the reaction of Arab leaders was hesitant, naïve, and simplistic as they all scoured to condemn “terrorism.” Surprisingly, Arab leaders helped rationalize the US backlash by immediately accepting the blame even before any concrete evidence was produced linking Arabs to the event in the first place. This automatically put Arabs on the defensive as the list of US demands grew bigger every day and Arab compliance was requested, and granted, on every occasion.

Unlike Turkey, which indicated that it would support a war on Iraq only if the US provided it with $30 billion in financial aid,¹⁵ Arab support came for free all the time. Israel continued to kill and persecute Palestinians everyday, yet Arab leaders failed on every occasion to put any sort of pressure on their ally, the US, to force Israel to accept any kind of resolution. Once again, Arab leaders were on the slippery slope of never-ending concessions to their patron and supporter, the United States.

The wording of the statement issued by the Organization of Islamic States, which met at Doha, Qatar in October 2001, was indicative of the extent of Arab leaders’ support for the US. In perhaps the closest expression of outright support for the US, the spokesman for the conference, the Qatar foreign minister, Sheikh Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir al-Thani, said the raids into Afghanistan were understandable: “We don't blame the United States, because what happened in the United States is a big tragedy… Six thousand people were killed in one day, and they were killed by terrorist action.” Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal of Saudi Arabia told reporters that Muslim states wanted to help “eradicate terrorism, which harms the Islamic world and Islamic causes and has never served the Palestinian cause.”¹⁶ Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Maher said at a gathering at the American University in Cairo that “Egypt stands in solidarity with the United States in the fight against terrorism.”¹⁷

For the first time since the Intifada began, Palestinian policemen shot down their own people with live ammunition.¹⁸ The confrontation started when Palestinians rallied in the thousands to support Osama bin Laden and denounce the US attacks on Afghanistan. Yasir Arafat, fearing he would lose the sympathy of President George W. Bush, ordered a crackdown. Three Palestinians were dead and more than 50 were injured in clashes.¹⁹ Most Gulf States allowed their territory to become a launch pad for attacks on Afghanistan, and almost all Arab states shared intelligence with the United States.  

A footnote:
Isn't it strange that the U.S., which is thousands of miles from the Arab world, claims that it is concerned about the interests of the Iraqi people,  while many Arab countries do not even bother to think about that?

Who is responsible?
It was reported that a financial deal was concluded to cover up a crime (Lockerbie plane event) that the Libyan regime was accused of plotting, and which led to sentencing a Libyan intelligence officer to 20 years in jail, after many years of sanctions against Libya.

The new, or rather repulsive thing, is the Libyan offer to pay the family of each victim $10 million in compensation money.

This in fact forms a clear admittance by Libya of its responsibility of the crime, after a record denial that resulted in sanctions and in losses amounting to billions.

The poor Libyan people paid the price twice: once in the form of a collapsed economy, and another time to end the sanctions.

The other ugly side of this is that UK accepts that compensation. This means that the security of peoples and citizens could be bought for a price. If Gaddafi was the perpetrator, he personally, and not his people, should be tried. If not, the families of the victims shouldn't accept his compensation.

Either way, both sides are guilty, just like the criminal in all criminal laws around the world… who is the executioner… and who is the victim?

The crisis… and the Arab administration!

At a time when the entire world stands at attention and full readiness to face the consequences of what's happening in the Arab world, and its international implications over financial, political and social security, some of the Arab nations are just relaxing… out of time and out of actions, as if these critical moments, with the world standing at the edge of a raging volcano mean nothing to them.

How to face the next stage? How do we plan to face what comes next? What have we prepared for it? Big events… a political earthquake have fallen onto our shoulders, but we didn't act, think or prepare ourselves.

- Some of our rulers knew from newspapers of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the balancing power vs. the United states.

- The Shah of Iran was knocked over and replaced by a new system. We did not know how to deal with the old system nor the new one.

- Afghanistan was invaded and turned upside down, yet some of our governments had no clue what happened.

Everything changes… except Arab rulers. Everything advances… except our worn-out ideas.
What do we have in store to face the next stage?

Nobody can claim they are not concerned with what's happening in the Arab world. This is fate creeping at us very quickly and we can't stop it. It might be too late to ask this question. But who is going to think? To act? To point out priorities? That will remain unanswered… unanswered!

Conclusions

As the US prepares for war on Iraq and threatens a radical transformation in the region, international anti-war public opinion grows stronger everyday. France, Russia and China are working hard to counterbalance increasing American belligerency in order to save their prestige and their position in the world hierarchy of power – a position which would be greatly undermined if the US launches a war on Iraq without UN consent.

Yet no other region is as much threatened by the proposed attack on Iraq as the Arab world is. No other nation will face direct political, economic and social transformation by an invading Western power. No other nation will be forced to hand over its resources to a foreign power or allow its territory to be redrawn by a president who talks openly about restructuring “the future of the Muslim world.”²⁰ Ironically, the weakest response to US hegemonic designs came from the official Arab system. If all of the above does not constitute a threat and a wake up call to the now defunct official Arab system, what does? In the Arab world, nobody plans, not even the Planning Ministries. There is no state mechanism. And some Arab leaders act like that Bedouin who covered his head and said: Nothing matters as far as I and my camel are safe!

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1- Al-‘Azab al-Tayyib al-Tahir, “What do the Arabs Want?”  Al-Rayah but quoted from Mideast Mirror February 25^th, 2003

2- Johanna McGeary, “Looking Beyond Saddam,”  Time.com  March 2^nd, 2003

3- Robert Burns, “US Plans Heavy Bombing Campaign in Iraq,”  Associated Press March 5^th, 2003

4- Robin Wright, “Hussein’s Successor Might Be the US,”  LA Times February 28^th, 2003

5- Johanna McGeary, “Looking Beyond Saddam,”  Time.com March 2^nd, 2003

6- Knut Royce, “Plan: Tap Iraq’s Oil,”  Newsday January 10^th,2003

7- James Bennet, “Israel Says War on Iraq Would Benefit the Region,”  New York Times  February 27^th, 2003

8- Sati’e Noureddin, “Summitry and the Arab Predicament,”  from As-Safir but quoted from Mideast Mirror February 27^th, 2003.

9- Abdelbari Atwan, “Mubarak Changes His Mind,”  al-Quds al-Arabi, quoted from Mideast Mirror, “The Arab Political System Fails…. Again,”  February 18^th, 2003

10- “Saddam Urged to Step Down At Arab Summit,”  Associated Press March 1^st, 2003

11- “Summit Shows Sharp Divisions on Iraq,”  Associated Press March 1^st, 2003

12- Bilal Abdul-Kareem, “Internal Strife and Old Rhetoric at the Arab League’s Summit,” Jihad Unspun  March 3^rd, 2003

13- Charles F. Hermann, “Decision Structure and Process Influences on Foreign Policy,”  in Maurice East, Stephen Salmore, and Charles Hermann, eds. Why Nations Act: Theoretical Perspectives for Foreign Policy Studies (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1978): 80

14- Bahgat Korany, Rex Brynen, and Paul Noble, “The Analysis of National Security in the Arab Context: Restating the State of the Art,”  in The Many Faces of National Security in the Arab World (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1993): 9.

15- Tony Karon, “Is Saddam a Menace or a Nuisance,”  Time.com  February 19^th, 2003

16- Kifner, John. “56 Islamic Nations Avoid Condemning U.S. Attacks, but Warn on Civilian Casualties,”  New York Times October 11, 2001  

17- MacFarquhar, Neil. “Anger Smolders in the Streets, Arab Governments Temper Remarks,”  New York Times October 9, 2001

18- Fisher, Ian. “Arafat's Policemen Kill Two Protesters Against U.S. Strike,”  New York Times October 9, 2001

19- “Clash of Palestinians, Police Turns Fatal,”  The Arizona Republic October 9, 2001: A7

20- Johanna McGeary, “Looking Beyond Saddam,”  Time.com March 2^nd, 2003